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The purpose of this report is to uncover the factors behind what has been a very strong 
productivity performance from the coal mining industry in Canada over the past four 
decades.  It is found that real price movements have had a substantial impact on 
productivity growth in the coal mining industry in Canada.  The real price of coal 
increased sharply in the 1970s due to higher demand caused by the oil price shock.  This 
increased the profitability of sites of marginal quality and thereby lead to operations on 
less productive sites than those in production at that point.  This had the effect of 
lowering the average productivity of the overall industry.  However, since the 1970s, the 
real price of coal has fallen steadily, reversing this effect and hence contributing to the 
high productivity growth of the 1980s and 1990s.  Another factor in this impressive 
productivity performance, at least in the 1980s, was the gradual closing of underground 
coal mines and the concentration of production on open surface mines.  Surface mines 
typically have higher levels of labour productivity than underground mines, so this effect 
reinforced the price effect in increasing the average productivity of the industry.  The 
1990s saw the computerization of several stages of the production process, from site 
planning to extraction.  Despite having the image of an old-fashioned industry, the coal 
mining industry in Canada is actually among the most intensive users of advanced 
technologies, and this certainly appears to have contributed to the industry’s strong 
productivity performance as well.   v   




In December 2002, the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) 
delivered to Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) an overview report entitled 
“Productivity Trends in Natural Resource Industries in Canada.”  This report examined 
trends and drivers or determinants of labour, capital, and total factor productivity for all 
20 natural resource industries in Canada over the 1961-2000 period.  In February and 
March of 2004, CSLS prepared for NRCan in-depth analyses of the drivers of labour 
productivity growth for a subset of these industries, consisting of nine selected natural 
resource industries (coal mining, gold mining, diamond mining, electricity generation, oil 
and gas, logging and forestry, wood products, paper products, and earth sciences).  This 
report is the result of the analysis undertaken for the coal mining industry. 
 
The report includes a review of the literature on coal mining productivity.  Several 
studies identify the adoption of new technologies and techniques as important drivers of 
productivity in coal mining.  Two periods of significant change in the real price of coal 
are found to have had substantial impacts on productivity growth.  The first is the sharp 
increase in the 1970s.  The second is the steady downward trend throughout the 1980s.  
In addition, after virtually no movement in the real price of coal in the 1990s, there was a 
pronounced decline between 1997 and 2000.  High prices encourage the exploitation of 
marginal reserves, which results in low productivity levels for individual mines and lower 
productivity growth for the industry as a whole through a composition effect.  Increasing 
returns to scale, labour-management relations, and the adjustment to new regulations are 
also found to be important. 
 
In studying these productivity drivers for the Canadian coal mining industry, the 
report first reviews the salient characteristics of the industry.  Some interesting 
observations are the following: 
 
·  the coal mining industry accounted for 0.15 per cent of total economy output in 
Canada in 2000, and 0.04 per cent of employment; 
 
·  in 2001 there were 20 coal mines in Canada, down from an average of around 30 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and significantly lower than the 80 to 100 mines in the 
1960s and 1970s; 
 
·  workers in the coal mining industry have a high level of average years of, both 
relative to other mining industries and to the total economy, driven by a very high 
proportion of workers with college or vocational training; 
 
·  despite having the image of an old-fashioned industry, the mining industry in 
Canada is actually among the most intensive users of advanced technologies; and 
   vi   
·  the price of coal rose rapidly in the early 1970s – due to demand pressures caused 
by substitution away from oil after the oil price boom – and has declined more or 
less steadily since the early 1980s. 
 
The labour productivity performance of the Canadian coal mining industry was 
very strong over the 1961-2000 period.  In the 1960s output per hour growth was very 
rapid, but the level of real output per hour was below that of the total economy.  In the 
1970s labour productivity stagnated, but the 1980s and 1990s saw a return to very strong 
output per hour growth.  By 2000 the coal mining industry had a level of real output per 
hour three times that of the total economy.  The Canadian coal mining industry has also 
seen a substantial improvement in its level of labour productivity relative to the U.S. coal 
mining industry, from 20 per cent in 1961 to 85 per cent in 2000. 
 
The report applies a simple growth accounting framework to attempt to identify 
the drivers of output per hour growth in the Canadian coal mining industry in each of 
these periods.  Capital intensity growth is found to have been a very important driver of 
labour productivity in the 1960s, but the impressive output per hour growth in the 1980s 
and 1990s appears to have been driven more by total factor productivity growth than 
capital intensity growth.  The report makes the following findings, based on the literature 
review and trends in more specific factors affecting productivity growth. 
 
·  1960s: strong labour productivity growth driven by strong capital intensity growth 
(new operating processes, conveyor systems and larger vehicles). 
 
·  1970s: weak labour productivity growth, partly attributable to labour disputes and 
adaptation to new environmental and safety regulations, but driven primarily by 
high demand for coal, which increased the price of coal and encouraged the 
exploitation of marginal reserves. 
 
·  1980s: a return to very high productivity growth, but not due to capital deepening 
as in the 1960s.  Rather, falling prices forced mines on less productive sites to 
close, while the transition from underground to higher-productivity surface mines 
was also taking place. 
 
·  1990s: weak productivity growth in the first half of the decade but exceptional 
growth in the latter half.  Prices continued to fall, but the more important driver 
seems to be technology, with the computerization of most operations.Productivity Trends in the Coal Mining Industry in Canada 
 
  In December 2002, the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) 
delivered to Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) an overview report entitled 
“Productivity Trends in Natural Resource Industries in Canada” (CSLS, 2003).  This 
report examined trends and drivers or determinants of labour, capital, and total factor 
productivity for all 20 natural resource industries in Canada over the 1961-2000 period.  
In February and March of 2004, CSLS prepared for NRCan in-depth analyses of the 
drivers of labour productivity growth for a subset of these industries, consisting of nine 
selected natural resource industries (coal mining, gold mining, diamond mining, 
electricity generation, oil and gas, logging and forestry, wood products, paper products, 
and earth sciences).  A summary of these analyses is found in CSLS (2004).  The present 
report is the result of the analysis undertaken for the coal mining industry.
1 
 
  The report is divided into four sections plus a conclusion.  The first section 
presents a review of the literature on coal mining productivity.  The second section 
presents detailed observations on the salient characteristics of the Canadian coal mining 
industry.  The third section presents data on labour, capital and total factor productivity 
growth and levels in the Canadian coal mining industry.  The fourth section focuses on 
labour productivity, and attempts to identify the factors explaining the labour productivity 
growth performance of the Canadian coal mining industry over the past four decades. 
 
 
I.  Literature Review of Studies on Productivity in the Coal Mining 
Industry 
 
This section reviews the literature to attempt to uncover the factors behind what 
has been a remarkable productivity performance from the Canadian coal industry over 
most of the past four decades.  Unfortunately there have been very few studies done on 
the Canadian coal industry specifically, let alone on the productivity performance of that 
industry.  Attention has focused especially on the U.S. coal industry.  However, it will 
generally be possible to extend the conclusions of these studies to the Canadian industry, 
with one possible caveat.  As will be discussed, a number of authors have identified a link 
between productivity gains and the shift from underground to open-pit mining in the 
United States.  The gradual closing of underground mines in Canada in past decades may 
indeed have played a large role in the success of the Canadian industry in terms of 
productivity growth, to be discussed in the fourth section; but by the late 1990s virtually 
all of the underground coal mines in Canada had been closed, meaning that this factor 
was no longer contributing to the productivity growth of the industry. 
 
                                                 
1 CSLS would like to thank NRCan for financial support to undertake this research.  The author would like 
to thank NRCan officials for comments on earlier drafts and Andrew Sharpe for comments and guidance.  
Comments can be directed to the author at jeremy.smith@csls.ca.  The reports on gold mining and diamond 
mining are available as CSLS Research Reports 2004-08 and 2004-09 respectively at www.csls.ca under 
Publications and Research Reports, and the reports on the remaining six industries are available upon 
request from info@csls.ca.   2 
 
A.  Anton (1981) 
 
  One important and general reference on the Canadian coal mining industry is 
Anton (1981), which provides an extensive overview of coal mining in Canada, the role 
of labour-management relations in Canadian coal production, the end-uses of coal, social 
and environmental factors related to coal, and Canada’s role in world coal production.  
While not a recent reference, many of these observations are still relevant.  Anton (1981) 
also makes some observations on the drivers of productivity in coal mining, including an 
early recognition of the importance of research and development in improving recovery 
rates and average production per shift.  Factors mentioned by Anton as contributing 
negatively to the productivity performance of coal mining in the 1970s are an 
inexperienced workforce, unrest and poor labour-management relations, and slow 
adaptation to higher costs of complying with safety and environmental regulations.
2  
 
B.  Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt (2001) 
 
  The most comprehensive treatment of the coal mining industry in the United 
States in terms of its productivity performance was undertaken by a group of researchers 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  The culmination of this research is a study 
by Denny Ellerman, Thomas Stoker and Ernst Berndt (2001) appearing in a National 
Bureau of Economic Research volume on productivity analysis.  The novelty of this 
research is the use of a highly disaggregated data set, allowing observations to be made 
concerning the specific drivers of productivity in certain types of mines and geographic 
areas.  These observations in turn allow the identification of the effect of productivity 
drivers in each of these groupings of mines on aggregate coal mining productivity. 
 
  Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt first divide their sample into Western, Interior and 
Appalachian mines, and each of these groupings further into underground-continuous, 
underground-longwall, and surface operations, and study their productivity performance 
over the 1972-1995 period.
3  The importance of this division turns out to be that it allows 
the distinction between mines of typically long and short operating lives.
4  The authors 
develop a framework in which the productivity growth of a given aggregate can be 
decomposed into five effects: a scale effect; a fixed (industry-specific) effect; a price 
effect; a time effect; and a residual. 
 
                                                 
2 Chaykowski (1992) gives a more recent overview that deals particularly with labour relations and the 
importance of mining industries in Canada, and briefly with Canada’s importance in world production.  His 
analysis includes coal, but also many individual mineral and metal industries. 
3 Longwall mining refers to the mining of a single face of a rectangular coal deposit, with roof supports that 
automatically advance with the mining equipment as the operation cuts the face further back.  
Alternatively, continuous mining entails mining inside a rectangular deposit, which requires large amounts 
of coal to be left in place as support pillars (hence the common name of room and pillar mining) and the 
manual installation of additional supports. 
4 Another important advantage, of course, is that the average effects implied by the regression results are 
not affected by heterogeneity in production technologies and geological factors, as results from regressions 
on aggregate data would be.   3 
The most substantial impact on the labour productivity of coal mines with long 
working lives is found to be scale.  That is, the larger is a mine that will be in operation 
for the foreseeable future, the more productive its workers are likely to be.  Although the 
authors are careful not to conclude from these results that increasing returns to scale are 
driving productivity growth,
5 they draw an important conclusion.  This is that larger firms 
seem to have the ability to more effectively deal with production bottlenecks and to 
realize the benefits of embodied and disembodied technical advance.  That is, regardless 
of whether there are constant or increasing returns to scale, larger firms are able to make 
better use of new technologies and processes than smaller firms. 
 
  For mines with typically shorter operating lives, such as continuous (room and 
pillar) underground mines and eastern surface mines, the fixed effect is the most 
important driver of productivity.  The fixed effect is the portion of productivity growth 
accounted for by specific attributes of individual mines, which the authors interpret as 
driven primarily by differences in technical capacity.  Therefore, when high productivity 
growth is largely driven by the fixed effect, it is an indication of more rapid technological 
advancement relative to other mines.  Profitability on sites with relatively limited 
reserves requires rapid exploitation of these reserves.  This, the authors state, is facilitated 
by use of the most recent technology available.  Such use of state of the art equipment 
and processes allows the virtually instant attainment of optimal capacity and the 
maintenance of this capacity for the life of the operation. 
 
  Technical advance is hence important for both short- and longer-lived mines, but 
in the latter case the absolute benefit derived from technologies is mediated by the size of 
the operation.  Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt also find the price effect to be important for 
all mine groupings.  As the real price of coal increases, it becomes profitable to mine sites 
in which it would be too expensive to invest the effort and capital necessary to extract the 
coal if it were to be sold at a lower price.  This creates a composition effect, as low 
productivity mines begin operation in periods of price increases, lowering the average 
productivity of the overall grouping. 
 
  The authors aggregate their decomposed results in order to determine which of the 
price, fixed, time, scale and residual effects were most important in aggregate coal 
mining productivity in the United States for the 1972-1995 period.  They find that by far 
the price effect was most important for the overall period and the 1972-1978 period, but 
was slightly exceeded in importance by the fixed effect for the 1978-1995 period, when 
coal prices were more or less on a steady decline.  For the earlier period, which witnessed 
                                                 
5 Size is measured using a transformation of output, measured in terms of tonnes of coal.  It is possible, 
then, that the mines identified as being large are simply those that produce more through the employment 
of more capital, and it is well-known that higher capital intensity leads to higher productivity, other things 
constant.  Therefore, the result of a large size effect could be driven solely by the fact that larger mines are 
more capital intensive, which is not inconsistent with constant returns to scale.  If there were certainly 
increasing returns to scale, the easy solution for improving productivity would simply be to increase both 
capital and labour inputs, since the resulting increase in output would be proportionately more than the 
increase in inputs, and labour productivity would by definition be higher.  Unfortunately, since their data 
set did not contain information on the capital stock, the authors were not able to test for increasing returns 
to scale by holding capital intensity constant and observing if their size effects still held.   4 
steep increases in the real price of coal as demand switched to oil substitutes after the oil 
price shock of 1973, the scale effect also made a substantial contribution to declining 
labour productivity.  The authors state that during this period, the rising price of coal 
encouraged the opening of a large number of mines that were not only geologically 
inferior but also of relatively small scale.  This meant that a large amount of effort was 
being expended with a very small increase in overall production, creating an overall 
disastrous labour productivity performance. 
 
  A brief word should also be said about a result not stressed by the authors.  The 
time and price effects are separated by using dummy variables to separate the effect of 
years judged to be anomalous within individual mine groupings.  However, the authors 
eventually find that such anomalous years occurred in different periods in the 1970s for 
different types of mines.  They attribute this to a different schedule of the implementation 
of health and safety regulations for underground as opposed to open-pit mines.  The first 
years of the sample mark years of new regulations for underground mining, and the 
dummy variables effectively separated the effects of adjustment in these years from the 
price effect.  But such regulations were not imposed on surface mines until later in the 
1970s.  The authors deal with this situation by using dummy variables in different years 
for different types of mines, but the more important message from this exercise is the 
effect of regulations on productivity.  In the first years of regulation it appears that mines 
did face adjustment costs in terms of productivity declines, although it would require a 
more normative analysis to judge whether the lost production in these years has been 
more than offset by the record of improved workplace safety that resulted.  However, the 
maximized fit of the regressions when only between two and six years of adjustment are 
marked with dummy variables suggests that workplace safety regulations have not had a 
permanent depressing effect on coal mining labour productivity.
6 
 
C.  Darmstadter (1999) 
 
  Darmstadter (1999) is a non-technical but equally comprehensive analysis of coal 
mining productivity, which refers to the earlier research upon which Ellerman, Stoker and 
Berndt (2001) is based.  Without attempting to rank their importance, he discusses six 
factors which have been important for U.S. coal mining productivity: shifts in production 
between different types of mines; adoption of new technologies; regulation; periods of 




  Two important shifts have occurred in the production of coal in the United States 
in the past few decades that have had important compositional effects in improving 
overall coal mining productivity.  The first is the shift from underground to surface 
operations, and the second from continuous to longwall techniques within underground 
                                                 
6 Moreover, although this is not tested by the authors, it is possible that a separate dummy variable for years 
after adjustment to regulation would further improve the fit of the regressions, implying that a safer work 
environment may have lead to higher trend labour productivity in the long run. 
7 These changing market environments refer to what has already been discussed in terms of the rising real 
price of coal in the 1970s and the exit of less efficient firms as the price declined thereafter.   5 
production.  Surface mining operations have historically been much more productive than 
underground mining, for the simple reason that the coal is more easily accessible and so 
more easily mined, being free of structural concerns and small passages that limit 
underground operations.  Longwall operations are more productive than continuous 
operations because larger machines that are capable of more rapidly shearing the coal can 
be utilized.  Also, there are fewer breaks in production with longwall operations, since it 
is not necessary to pause production to install roof supports as it is in continuous 
operations.  These two shifts have hence both been beneficial to average coal mining 
labour productivity in growth and level terms: lower-productivity underground mining 
has a constantly improving productivity level as production continues to shift to longwall 
operations; and the share of higher-productivity surface mining has continued to increase 
in the past few decades. 
 
  Darmstadter (1999) gives a broad definition of technological progress, including 
improvements in the characteristics of new investments, increases in the scale of new 
investments, and increases in the skills base of the operators of such new investments.  
This is hence a largely embodied view of innovation, i.e. technological improvements are 
embedded in equipment and do not include such things as process improvements 
unrelated to equipment.  Nonetheless, the author notes improvements in each aspect made 
by the U.S. coal mining industry in the past several years.  For example, the shovel, 
dragline (primarily surface), shearing (primarily underground), and hauling vehicles have 
all increased markedly in size, while machines specific to the site geology have 
increasingly been used, and computers adopted both for management of operations and 
for more effective site planning. 
 
  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the coal industry was just beginning to recover 
from a decade of poor productivity performance.  Many observers noted that the 
beginning of this period also marked the introduction of several safety and environmental 
regulations affecting mines specifically, and were quick to draw a causal link.  
Darmstadter quotes Denison (1985), who found that actual productivity growth in the 
1968-1977 period in U.S. coal mining was -3.5 per cent per year, but that growth would 
have been 3.1 per cent per year if the regulations had not been implemented.  The 
underlying cause of this six percentage point differential is that the regulations generally 
required much more labour effort, for example in terms of installing roof supports and 
accompanying mine inspectors, effort that did not lead to a commensurate increase in 
output.  Darmstadter (1999) notes that these studies were generally undertaken soon after 
the period of poor productivity growth and before the productivity rebound in the 1980s, 
and that in hindsight it now appears that regulatory effects are transitory and often not the 
only factor at work.  He also notes that environmental regulations imposed on coal-using 
industries in terms of emissions have actually improved coal mining productivity, since 
they have spurred demand for demand from western surface mines – whose coal has a 
substantially lower sulphur content – thus facilitating the productivity-enhancing shift to 
surface mining. 
 
  Two factors related to management are also highlighted by Darmstadter (1999), 
both in terms of further explaining the slow productivity growth of the 1970s and the   6 
rapid productivity growth thereafter.  The first is a period of acute labour unrest in the 
1970s, encompassing strikes by labour and an extended period of worker discontent.  Not 
only did these work stoppages directly decrease labour productivity (due to the need to 
employ some standby and maintenance personnel while no output was being produced), 
but the generally frustrated attitudes of the workers while on the job likely lead to a 
decline in motivation and effort as well.  The second management factor is management 
contracting and decision making, which showed some signs of innovation in the 1990s.  
Darmstadter quotes Pippenger (1995) in this respect, who provides a detailed case study 
of a particular mine and finds that increased productivity through innovation was the 
main driver of increased competitiveness of this mine.  Some of these innovative 
decisions have been the reorganization of shifts throughout the week to reduce 
maintenance down time, allow for regularly scheduled preventive maintenance, and 
reduce costs associated with shift turnover; and contracting with suppliers to ensure for 
more appropriate use of equipment. 
 
  Overall, Darmstadter (1999) sees promising performance from the U.S. coal 
industry in the future, but notes that the strong innovative stance of the industry in the 
past several years has been driven by increasingly fierce international competition.  Also, 
countries like the United Kingdom and Germany, who have traditionally been major 
international coal producers, have seen a decline in their coal industries over the past 
decade or so as competition from countries such as India and even Colombia has 
increased.  That said, he states that the U.S. coal industry has shown strength in adapting 
to market realities in the past, and is hence well placed to face future challenges. 
 
D.  Other Studies on Innovation and Coal Mining Productivity 
 
  Flynn (2000) echoes several of the conclusions of Darmstadter (1999) and the 
earlier research that culminated in Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt (2001).  He notes several 
advances in terms of mining equipment (scale and quality) and automated control, and 
also notes the favourable productivity impact of the shift to surface mining operations.  
He also notes that the falling real price of coal has contributed to the exit of inefficient 
firms.  On the other hand, he states that existing firms are now facing difficulties in 
keeping up the pace of technological adoptions as continued price declines lead to lower 
profitability.  He therefore sees an important role for policy in terms of assisting firms 
with the purchase of new machinery and equipment, which will in turn further increase 
their productivity performance and facilitate adaptation to lower prices. 
 
  Much has been said so far about the role of technology in improving coal mining 
productivity, and two further studies related to mining technology deserve mention here.  
The first is a study by the RAND corporation by Peterson, La Tourrette and Bartis 
(2001).  It finds that U.S. mining managers have in recent years developed a high 
aversion to investment risks due to low commodity prices and increased global 
competition.  Specifically, the report suggests that there are new technologies available to 
coal mines that will improve productivity – indeed, the report mentions that some have 
been adopted to a larger degree by Canadian mines as compared to U.S. mines – that the 
necessary capacity for their implementation is available, but that mines are not able to   7 
commit to adopting these technologies due to perceived risks of not being able to recoup 
their investments through higher production value.  This reinforces the concerns raised by 
Flynn (2000) that mines have been putting off further expenditures on new technologies 
due to the expectations of lower sales revenues from lower prices. 
 
The second is by Fred Kissell (2000) of the U.S. Bureau of Mines.  This study 
looks at past technology policies of the Bureau of Mines in order to discover the 
circumstances that surrounded their success or failure in terms of effective adoption by 
the mining industry.  While technology and innovation have been identified as key 
driving factors of productivity in mining industries, this study stresses the importance of 
appropriateness of technologies and the timing of their implementation in conjunction 
with the acquisition of the necessary complementary skills.  It identifies five factors that 
were essential for the eventual adoption by mines of technologies suggested by the 
Bureau. 
 
·  The first factor is pressure, as in the amount of pressure faced by mines from 
other sources to make improvements in a given area.  For example, the Bureau of 
Mines had done research in the 1960s into the benefits of illumination systems for 
underground mines and of monitoring systems for air quality, but mines did not 
adopt these technologies until safety regulations required them to do so. 
 
·  The second factor is the avoidance of pitfalls that seem obvious in hindsight.  For 
example, the Bureau had recommended advanced in-mine communication 
systems as early as the 1970s, but widespread use did not develop because the 
Bureau failed to foresee that specific training and servicing was required for any 
meaningful benefits to be derived. 
 
·  The third factor is the specific path of technology adoption, or more accurately the 
delay between the announcement of a new technology and its availability.  The 
Bureau found that when a suggested technology was a process innovation that 
involved only the description and perhaps demonstration of a new technique, 
adoption rates were higher than if a specific product had to be ordered from a 
manufacturer, perhaps involving customization, followed by required training in 
its use. 
 
·  The last two factors are financial in nature, namely the price of the innovation and 
the impact on mine profits.  Obviously the higher the initial cost of 
implementation and the more limited the probable benefits, the lower is the 
penetration of a given innovation. 
 
E.  Studies on Regulation, Scale and Other Factors Affecting Coal Mining 
Productivity 
 
Returning to the possible effects of regulation on productivity mentioned by 
Darmstadter (1999) and Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt (2001), an earlier contribution from 
Naples (1998) investigates the issue in more detail.  Naples closely examines the   8 
technical as well as social determinants of productivity in coal mining, and tests her 
hypotheses with data from 1955-1980.  She finds that the studies of the 1980s attributing 
the productivity declines of the 1970s to stringent new safety regulations greatly 
exaggerated the role played by these regulations.  These studies, for example Denison 
(1985), fail to account for other drastic changes affecting the coal industry in the 1970s.  
Most important of these, besides the basic technical driver of capital intensity, were the 
rising real price of coal and the rapidly deteriorating relations between managers and 
workers. 
 
While describing the difficulty of separating the individual effects of social 
indicators such as safety regulation and labour unrest from one another, Naples (1998) is 
the only study to jointly consider regulation effects with other social effects.  She finds 
that over two fifths of the productivity decline in the 1970s was due to social factors, 
compared to one fifth for price effects, with the remainder accounted for by slower 
capital intensity growth and a slowdown in the shift towards more efficient mining 
techniques.  Of this two-fifths share, Naples states that the increased strike activity played 
a larger role than adaptation to the new safety regulations, since the increase in labour 
unrest was of a higher magnitude than the increase in spending associated with 
compliance. 
 
The author also draws a link between increasing labour dissatisfaction leading up 
to the implementation of the new health and safety regulations and increased demands for 
better working environments, especially with the increased dust level commensurate with 
the development of continuous mining.  This suggests that once the regulations were 
complied with, workers’ concerns were largely answered and, except for the still sour 
relations with management, that worker satisfaction should have been higher than before 
the regulations.  Hence, conditional on good relations between labour and management, 
health and safety regulations can actually improve productivity, with the period after 
adjustment to the new regulations possibly marked by higher productivity growth than 
the pre-regulation period. 
 
Further insight on the scale effect mentioned by Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt 
(2001) can be gained from Boyd (1987).  In the discussion above of the more recent 
study, it was stated that the conclusion of higher productivity growth in larger mines 
could be driven either by increasing returns to scale or by the fact that larger firms are 
simply more capital intensive, but that it could not be determined which effect was 
present or dominating in that study.  Of course, as was discussed, this was not an 
impediment to that analysis since the major role of size in improving productivity in that 
study was deemed to be through facilitating greater benefits from technology.  However, 
separate from this technology effect, Boyd (1987) is able to study the effects of capital 
intensity and returns to scale separately. 
   9 
Boyd uses a technically advanced production function
8 to model firms with fixed 
effects (specifically, fixed geological properties, as is relevant to mines) and where 
returns to scale are dependent upon some of the inputs to production.  His estimations 
show that mines with higher investments in earth-moving machinery per worker tended 
to experience increasing returns to scale.  This suggests that larger mines are more 
productive both because they are benefiting from increasing returns to scale and because 
they become more capital intensive, since the former is in part caused by the latter.  In 
this sense, a possible method of increasing productivity growth may be to encourage 
larger operations through increased capital investment.  However, Boyd (1987) also notes 
that it is generally the case in mining that the site geology determines how big the 
operation can ultimately be, therefore limiting the ability of mines to attain optimal scale. 
 
One minor point made by some older studies on productivity in a more general 
setting than strictly mining is the effect of the level of unionization in the workforce on 
labour productivity.  Brown and Medoff (1978) and Mefford (1986) are two of the 
principal references in this area.  Several causal channels are mentioned, such as unions 
giving a greater voice to workers and hence improving worker satisfaction and efficiency, 
and unions imposing too many constraints on management and hence impeding overall 
efficiency.  With what has already been discussed for coal mining, it is easy to see the 
possibly conflicting causes of unions on coal mining productivity.
9  Since unions were 
instrumental in calling for safety reforms to mines, it is possible that the combined 
observation of union activism and declining productivity in the adjustment period 
following regulation could imply negative effects of unions on productivity.  However, 
by the high productivity growth 1980s there were far fewer mining strikes than in the 
1970s, implying that a more or less equivalent level of unionization was associated with 
more cooperative labour-management relations and productivity growth in this period. 
 
Chezum and Garen (1998) study a sample of 941 U.S. coal mines in the 1980s 
and find that unions are typically more prevalent in mines that are endowed with wider 
coal seams.  Since wider coal seams are in turn related to higher labour productivity 
levels, this leads to a positive relationship between unionization and productivity.  
However, the authors note that this is a spurious rather than causal relationship, and 
attempt to discover the effect of unions on productivity independently of this tendency 
for unions to be active in exogenously more productive mines.  They find that once seam 
thickness is controlled for, unions appear to exert an overall negative effect on 
productivity.  However, their model has some possibly important exclusions, most 
important of which is likely to be capital stock.  Hence, while further work would be 
necessary to more precisely quantify the union productivity effect, the general lesson of 
this work is that studies finding a large positive effect are likely overlooking the spurious 
nature of this relationship, and that the true relationship is likely minor. 
                                                 
8 The function is an arctangent transformation of a path-homothetic Cobb-Douglas production function, 
with overburden thickness, seam thickness and three types of capital intensity as inputs and each of the 
three capital intensities affecting returns to scale.  For a discussion of its properties, see Boyd (1984 and 
1987) and the references therein. 
9 Clement (1983:Chapters 7 and 8) states that Canadian miners were among the first workers in Canada to 
unionize, and that a large portion of the mining workforce tends to be unionized.  However, he does not 
comment on the possible linkages between this unionization and worker productivity.  10 
 
One final factor that has been identified as having a productivity effect in coal 
mining is changes in the structure of ownership, in terms of mergers and acquisitions.  
David Merrell (1999), of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, obtains panel data on all coal 
mines operating in the United States between 1978 and 1996, and develops a model that 
describes the conditions under which mines change ownership.  The theory tested by 
Merrell is that low-productivity firms may be suffering from poor relations between 
owners/management and workers, so that such firms are more likely to be involved in a 
management/ownership change.  Further, to the extent that the new owners have a better 
fit with workers, productivity should improve after the acquisition.  Merrell (1999) finds 
strong support for both aspects of this hypothesis, in that acquired firms are about 10 per 
cent less productive than non-acquired firms before acquisition, and show stronger than 
average productivity gains after being acquired.  To the extent that these changes in 
productivity actually reflect management issues as per the theory, this is further evidence 
supporting Naples’ (1998) findings that labour-management relations are an important 
and somewhat overlooked factor in determining productivity performance in coal mining.  
In this sense the results call more for policies dealing with improving labour relations 
rather than easing rules for merging coal mines, although the latter may play a role in the 
former. 
 
F.  Studies on Coal Mining Productivity in Other Countries 
 
Two final studies dealing with productivity in coal mining in other countries are 
worth briefly mentioning.  First of all, Humphris (1999) provides insights on productivity 
drivers in the Australian coal mining industry that are interesting largely because they 
correspond directly with those already identified as important for the United States.  He 
first mentions that several of Australia’s underground mines have switched to longwall 
techniques from more traditional techniques, and that this has greatly improved average 
productivity.  He also makes reference to the decreasing price of coal, the adoption of 
new technologies and processes, and improved worker flexibility and relations as 
contributing to strong Australian coal mining labour productivity growth. 
 
Kulshreshtha and Parikh (2002) use a Malmquist index technique to decompose 
total factor productivity growth in Indian coal mines into technical advance and 
efficiency improvement components.  Efficiency here refers to more complete use of 
resources that are already available, while technical advance refers to the improvement of 
production possibilities through the employment of new technologies or processes.
10  The 
main finding is that TFP growth has been driven more by technical advance in surface 
coal mining in India in the 1980s and 1990s, while underground coal mining TFP growth 
has been driven more by efficiency improvements.
11  The more interesting result in light 
                                                 
10 In terms of a production possibilities frontier, efficiency gains refer to a movement from an interior point 
closer to the frontier, while technical advance refers to an outward shift of the frontier. 
11 Using a similar type of model, Asafu-Adjaye and Mahadevan (2003) find that technological advance has 
had a larger effect on Australian coal mining TFP growth than efficiency improvements (and also find that 
increasing returns to scale made a somewhat large contribution to TFP growth as well).  However, they do 
not divide their sample into surface and underground mines.  11 
of the U.S. conclusions, however, is that open-pit coal mines have tended to experience 
lower productivity growth in India than underground coal mines, in opposition to the 
situation in the United States.  This may be driven by the unavailability of excavating 
machinery in India on as large a scale as in the United States, or poor quality reserves 
near the surface in India as opposed to the generally rich surface seams in the western 
United States. 
 
G.  Summary 
 
In terms of attempting to quantify the importance of the productivity drivers in the 
coal industry discussed here, it would appear that the adoption of new technologies and 
techniques has been identified by the largest number of observers within the industry and 
those studying the sector from the outside.  Two periods of significant change in the real 
price of coal are found to have had substantial impacts on productivity growth.  The first 
is the sharp increase in the 1970s.  The second is the steady downward trend throughout 
the 1980s.  In addition, after virtually no movement in the real price of coal in the 1990s, 
there was a pronounced decline between 1997 and 2000.  Increasing returns to scale, 




II.  Characteristics of the Coal Mining Industry in Canada 
 
A.  Data Sources for Industry-Level Studies 
 
  The primary source of data for this report is the set of appendix tables provided 
with the CSLS (2003) report prepared for Natural Resources Canada on productivity 
trends in natural resources industries.  However, some series provided in those tables 
have been updated to reflect more recent data availability. 
 
  Most data presented in CSLS (2003) are from Statistics Canada’s Aggregate 
Productivity Measures (APM) program, classified according to the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) and available generally from 1961 through 1997.  The SIC has been 
superseded by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), and the 
APM series have not yet become available for a long time period based on NAICS.
12  
The general method has hence been to use the APM series for 1961-1997 and extend 
these series forward to 2002 using growth rates from alternative (generally NAICS-
based) sources with more recent data available.
13  This results in the longest time series 
possible. 
                                                 
12 The Statistics Canada Productivity Program, in December 2003, released new estimates of labour 
statistics (jobs, hours worked and compensation) and labour productivity and related variables (output per 
hour, capital per hour, output per unit of capital stock and multifactor productivity) for selected business 
sector industries based on NAICS for the 1997-2002 period, and they have since been updated to 2003.  
The Timeline Continuity Project aims to release these data for the 1961-2003 period sometime in the Fall 
of 2004. 
13 A word of caution is in order considering data for 2001 and 2002 though.  2001 was a recession year, and 
2002 was a year of expansion in most industries but not a peak year, so including these years in growth rate  12 
 
  The APM real value added by industry series are expressed in 1992 constant 
dollars at factor cost, based on a fixed weighted Laspeyres index.  These have been 
updated from 1997 onwards with GDP by Industry series, according to NAICS, 




The APM hours worked and jobs series are based on data from the Labour Force 
Survey, with adjustments made from establishment-based surveys.  These have been 
updated from 1997 onwards with the new Productivity Program Database hours and jobs 
series, released on December 4, 2003.  These estimates are based on a similar 
methodology as the APM hours and jobs estimates, but are classified based on NAICS 
rather than the SIC. 
 
In contrast to the GDP, hours and employment series, the capital stock series have 
undergone major methodological changes at the same time as converting from SIC to 
NAICS.
15  Fortunately, however, the new series are available for the entire 1961-2002 
period based on the new methodology and NAICS, for detailed industries.  Hence, the 
method of extending the old series using growth rates from the new series for 1997-2002 
only has not been followed for capital stock.  Rather, the new series have been used for 
the entire period. 
 
Based on these updated output, hours and capital stock series discussed here, new 
series of labour productivity, capital productivity, total factor productivity and capital 
intensity have been calculated.  The labour productivity series are identical to those in 
CSLS (2003) for 1961-1997 but vary for the 1997-2000 period.  The series involving 
capital stock differ moderately from those in CSLS (2003) for the entire 1961-2000 
period due to the new capital stock methodology. 
 
As in CSLS (2003), the total factor productivity indexes are calculated with fixed 
1997 factor shares according to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  In this production framework, if the strong assumption of short-run profit 
maximization is made, the elasticity of output with respect to the labour input (hours 
worked) is identical to the share of total output paid to labour.  The share of output paid 
to capital is then calculated residually as unity (the sum of the two shares with constant 
                                                                                                                                                 
calculations (which are generally calculated from business cycle peak to peak to achieve cyclical neutrality) 
will impart a cyclical bias.  The discussion in the following sections will hence focus only on the period up 
to 2000. 
14 CSLS (2003) includes an appendix on the concordance of natural resources industries according to 
NAICS and according to SIC.  This change in classification does not affect the coal mining industry, as the 
SIC industry concords directly with the NAICS industry. 
15 Without presenting the details of these technical methodology updates, the motivation for the updates 
was a desire to present geometric-depreciated capital stock estimates on a methodologically equivalent 
basis as the United States.  The estimates generally show a higher level and lower growth than the estimates 
based on the old methodology and contained in CSLS (2003).  This is due to a uniform depreciation profile 
for a given investment cohort, in contrast to the division into sub-cohorts based on individual depreciation 
schedules that was used in the previous and less-preferred methodology (Statistics Canada, 2000).  13 
returns to scale) minus the labour share.  The labour share in 1997 is calculated by 
multiplying average weekly earnings (from the Survey of Employment, Payrolls and 
Hours) by employment and 52 weeks and dividing by current-dollar value added, all for 
1997.  There are a number of problems with this approach, especially with assuming 
constant returns to scale in many industries and in assuming profit maximization in 
general.  The result of these problems is that the interpretation of TFP growth must be 
treated as very broad.  TFP growth in this framework can reflect technological progress, 
changes in any factors of production besides labour and capital (e.g. skills, energy), or 
violation of any of the assumptions.  It will hence be important in the coming sections to 
describe the various possible drivers of measured TFP growth in detail rather than simply 
ascribing changes in TFP to technological change. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are at least two other sources of 
productivity and related variables by industry in Canada.  The Productivity Program 
Database, from which data on hours and jobs for 1997-2002 are taken for the present 
analysis, also includes estimates of labour productivity, capital productivity, capital 
intensity and multifactor productivity for certain industries.  The unfortunate aspects of 
this dataset are that data are presently only available from 1997-2003, data are not 
released for some detailed industries due to data quality concerns, and data are only 
available in index form (i.e. growth rate analysis is possible but not level analysis).
16 
 
The Centre for the Study of Living Standards also maintains a productivity data 
base.  Data are available for about 230 detailed industries (all for which the underlying 
data are available), for Canada and all ten provinces.  Real value added data are from the 
GDP by Industry program, hours and employment are from the Labour Force Survey, and 
capital stock data are provided by the Capital Stocks Division.  Total factor productivity 
estimates are calculated according to the same methodology described above.  The data 
base is updated once or twice annually, with annual data available currently from 1987-
2003, according to NAICS.
17 
 
B.  Size, Regional Distribution, and Organization of the Coal Mining Industry in 
Canada 
 
  Real GDP in the coal mining industry was about $1.2 billion (1992 constant 
dollars at factor cost) in 2000, compared to total economy real GDP of $788 billion.  Coal 
mining therefore accounted for 0.15 per cent of Canadian output in 2000 – up from 0.07 
per cent in 1961 – and around 15 per cent of that of the overall mining industry (CSLS, 
                                                 
16 As mentioned previously, the Timeline Continuity Project, expected to be completed sometime in the 
Fall of 2004, will extend these series back to 1961.  The series used in the present study correspond with 
those from the Productivity Program Database for 1997 onwards due to common data used in their 
construction.  It is not known how the present series will correspond with the Productivity Program series 
once data are available for 1961-1997, since the new data for this period will be based on NAICS. 
17 The estimates employed in this report differ slightly from those in the CSLS productivity data base, due 
to a different source for hours and employment data, but growth rates are broadly similar for the time 
period for which both sets of estimates are available.  In general, the Productivity Program Database/APM 
hours estimates are probably more comprehensive than the Labour Force Survey estimates, but the CSLS 
data base does not employ them since they are available to less industry detail.  14 
2003:Table 28).
18  Coal mining’s share of total economy employment was lower, at 0.04 
per cent, representing a decrease over the 1961-2000 period as opposed to the rising 
output share (Table 30).  About 6,000 of the 15 million Canadian jobs in 2000 were in 
coal mining, down from 11,000 in 1961.  The evolution of coal mining’s output and 
employment contributions to the total economy are shown in Chart 1, and summary 




Table 1: Output, Employment, Hours and Capital Stock Growth in the Coal Mining 
Industry in Canada, 1961-2000, compound average annual growth rates, per cent 
  Real Value 
Added  Employment  Hours Worked  Capital Stock  
1961-2000  5.59  -1.54  -1.48  4.55 
1961-1973  5.62  -3.05  -3.35  11.90 
1973-1981  6.96  5.31  5.16  6.77 
1981-1989  9.97  -0.60  0.62  3.11 
1989-2000  1.52  -5.29  -5.51  -3.43 
Source: CSLS (2003), with updates from GDP by Industry, the Labour Force Survey, and 
the Capital Stocks Division. 
   
There were 21 coal mines in Canada in 2001, a sharp drop from 28 in 2000 and 
the average of about 30 throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
19  The number of coal mines in 
Canada was much higher in the early 1960s – between 80 and 100 – but declined sharply 
                                                 
18 The data from CSLS (2003) have been updated throughout, as discussed above. 
19 Data on the number of establishments are from the Annual Census of Mines carried out by Natural 
Resources Canada for Statistics Canada.  Data are disseminated via annual Statistics Canada publications 
(e.g. Coal Mining, catalogue number 26-206) and CANSIM, Statistics Canada’s online data service (e.g. 
tables 152-0005 and 152-0002).  New estimates for 2001 are from the 2001 Annual Census of Mines, 
released on February 23, 2004. 
 Chart 1: Share of the Coal Mining Industry in the Total  
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in the second half of the 1960s and most of the 1970s, to as low as 20 in 1974.  These 
mine openings and closings do not appear to be related to year-to-year changes in the 
price of coal (Chart 2).  However, both the real price of coal and the number of coal 




The 28 mines in 2000 were concentrated in Western Canada.  There were 13 
mines in Saskatchewan and Alberta, eight in British Columbia, six in Nova Scotia, and 
one in New Brunswick.  Coal mining establishments, besides being more numerous, were 
also of larger scale in Western Canada.  Coal mines in British Columbia had 364 
employees per establishment in 2000, compared to only 92 for Nova Scotia. 
 
  Canada has not historically been a major world coal producer.  In 2002 Canada 
produced about 0.8 per cent of world coal, tenth behind China (34.6 per cent of world 
production), the United States (23.9 per cent), India (8.9 per cent), Australia (7.2 per 
cent), South Africa (5.8 per cent), Russia (4.3 per cent), Poland (2.7 per cent), Indonesia 
(2.6 per cent), and Colombia (1.1 per cent).
20  In 1981 Canada’s share was 0.8 per cent as 
well, but Canada ranked 11
th place.  All countries except Colombia and Indonesia with 
higher production in 2002 had higher production in 1981 as well, and the United 
Kingdom, Germany and North Korea also had higher production than Canada.  In 1947 
and 1961 respectively, Canada’s world production shares of coal were 0.7 per cent and 
0.3 per cent, ranking 14
th and 15
th.  Over the 1947-2002 period the production share of 
China increased significantly, from about 1 per cent to almost 35 per cent.  The shares of 
Australia and India have also risen significantly over this period, while the United 
Kingdom and Germany have experienced large declines in their shares of world coal 
production. 
 
                                                 
20 These data are calculated from IEA (2003).  In 2002 Canada ranked slightly lower, 13
th place, in terms of 
coal in tonnes of oil equivalent, according to CANSIM table 130-0003. 
Chart 2: Number of Coal Mining Establishments and the Real 
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Source: Number of establishments from CANSIM Table 152-0002.  The real price of coal is the implicit 
price deflator for the coal mining industry from GDP by Industry data, deflated with the CPI.  16 
  The majority of coal mining in Canada appears to be undertaken by Canadian 
firms.  Very limited data on ownership are available without examining individual 
businesses.
21  However, the data that are available show foreign ownership at about one 
third of all Canadian coal mining enterprises on average over the 1980-1988 period for 
which data are available.  More recently, it would appear that the proportion of Canadian 
coal mines that are foreign-owned has decreased.  Three major Canadian corporations, 
each with multiple mines in Canada, are Sherritt International, Elk Valley Coal, and 
Fording. 
 
C.  Resource Base 
 
  Statistics Canada estimates that in 2001, the most recent year for which data are 
available, there were 4,555 million tonnes of proven coal reserves in Canada (i.e. that 
were known to exist with a high degree of certainty and that were judged to be consistent 
with profitable extraction).
22  This includes 2,247 million tonnes of bituminous coal and 
2,308 million tonnes of lower-quality subbituminous and lignite reserves.  Proven 
reserves have been much higher in the past, for example the 6,583 million tonnes in 1987, 
but were somewhat lower in 1976, at 4,311 million tonnes.  This implies that over the 
1976-1983 period there was either increased proven reserves through exploration and 
new discoveries, increased commercial viability through price changes and the diffusion 
of new mining techniques, or both.  The opposite is true between 1983 and 2001, and 
especially after 1998, when there was a sharp decline in proven reserves.  Relative to the 
4,555 million tonnes of reserves in 2001, extraction in that same year was only 68.4 
million tonnes (Chart 3).  At present extraction rates and profitability conditions, reserves 
are therefore equivalent to over 66 years of production.  The ratio of extraction to total 
stock has declined more or less steadily since 1976, with the stock equivalent to an 
average of 169 years of production in that year. 
 
D.  Labour Force and Related Characteristics 
 
  The coal mining industry appears to have a well-educated workforce, with 
average years of education per employed worker at 14.0 years in 2001 (CSLS 2003:Table 
47).  This compares to 13.5 years for all Canadian workers and 12.8 years for all (metal 
plus non-metal) mining workers.  Average years of schooling of workers in the coal 
mining industry increased by 1.0 per cent per year between 1976 and 2001, twice the all 
industries growth rate of 0.5 per cent per year.  This growth gap increased in the 1989-
2001 period, with average years of education advancing at an average annual rate of 2.2 
per cent per year over this period, relative to 1.0 per cent per year for all industries.  The 
slightly above-average years of schooling in coal mining reflects a very high proportion 
                                                 
21 Data on the foreign/domestic ownership of enterprises as well as their equity and asset holdings and 
profits were collected for all Canadian firms under the Corporations and Labour Unions Return Act for the 
1980-1988 period.  These data are available by detailed industry from Statistics Canada via CANSIM table 
179-0002.  Such data do not appear to be available beyond this period by industry. 
22 These estimates are taken from CANSIM Table 153-0017 and -0018.  Earlier estimates were published in 
Statistics Canada (2001).  17 
of workers with a post-secondary certificate or diploma (46.3 per cent in 2001), but a low 





  Average hourly labour compensation in the coal mining industry was $29.79 
(current dollars) in 1997, representing 153 per cent of the total economy average (CSLS 
2003:Table 35).  This is consistent with above-average wages in both metal and non-
metal mining, with the entire mining sector at 143 per cent of the total economy average. 
 
  The remarkable reduction in the incidence of injuries in mining in general has 
also been experienced by coal mining specifically.  In 1982 there were 2,958 injuries in 
coal mining in Canada, or 25.6 per 100 workers.  This compares to 11.4 per 100 workers 
in all mining and 4.3 per 100 workers in the total economy on average.  However, by 
2002 the incidence of injuries had declined sharply to 3.1 per 100 workers in coal mining, 
compared to 2.2 for both total mining and the total economy.  The incidence of 
workplace fatalities has also shown a marked decline in coal mining – from 133.7 per 
100,000 workers in 1993 to 93.2 per 100,000 workers in 2002 – but still shows a level 
much higher than the 6.0 per 100,000 workers at the total economy level. 
 
The average age of the coal mining workforce is higher than that of all industries.  
Based on custom tabulations from the 1996 and 2001 Censuses, the average age of the 
coal mining labour force was 40.9 in 1996, rising substantially to 44.3 in 2001.  For the 
                                                 
23 Educational attainment data are also available from the Census.  Custom tabulations from the 2001 
Census (based on a 20 per cent sample) show the proportion of coal workers with post-secondary 
qualifications as 46.0 per cent, and the proportion with a university degree as 6.1 per cent. 
Chart 3: Extraction and Proven Reserves of Coal in Canada, 
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 153-0017 and 153-0018.  18 




Data are also available from the Census on employment by industry and sex, and 
show that employment in the coal mining industry is heavily male-dominated.  In 2001 
males accounted for 53.1 per cent of the all industries workforce, down from 54.0 per 
cent in 1996.  For the coal mining industry the proportion of males in total employment 
was much larger, at 90.7 per cent in 2001, down from 92.0 per cent in 1996.
25 
 
  The proportion of mining employees covered by a union declined rapidly between 
1976 and 1995.  In 1976 the rate of union density was 44.3 per cent in mining, declining 
fairly steadily and reaching 24.7 per cent in 1995 (CSLS, 2003:Table 44).  Data from the 
Labour Force Survey on all primary industries excluding agriculture show a continued 
decline after 1997.  The rate of unionization remained fairly steady at the all industries 
level over 1976-1995, at between 27 and 29 per cent, and has not shown any marked 
trend since 1997 based on the Labour Force Survey data.  It is not known how well these 
average rates and trends hold for coal mining specifically. 
 
E.  Capital Intensity 
 
  Coal mines are very capital intensive operations.  In 2000, the ratio of capital 
stock to hours worked in the coal mining industry was $427.82 per hour (1997 dollars), 
compared to $61.69 for all industries.  Capital intensity also advanced much more rapidly 
over the 1961-2000 period in coal mining than in the total economy, at 6.1 per cent per 
year compared to 1.7 per cent per year.  Capital intensity advanced between 1989 and 
2000 by 2.2 per cent per year in coal mining and by 1.3 per cent per year in the total 
economy. 
 
  Unpublished data from the Capital Stocks Division of Statistics Canada show that 
a large proportion of the capital stock of the coal mining industry (71.5 per cent in 2002) 
was in engineering capital stock, with smaller proportions in structures capital stock (15.0 
per cent) and machinery and equipment (13.5 per cent).  Absolute declines in investment 
and capital stock in coal mining in the 1990s, especially in machinery and equipment, 
may mean that the coal mining sector has not benefited from technological advance 
embedded in new capital.  On the other hand, the high level of engineering products 
(which includes exploration expenditures) per hour worked may indicate that high and 
increasing effort is focused on searching for sites with more abundant deposits before 
mining begins, and on more efficiently extracting the deposits.  The engineering capital 
stock also includes expenditure on construction of and supporting structures for mine 
shafts and pits, and on conveyor systems to move coal from the pit. 
                                                 
24 These tabulations are based on a 20 per cent sample, and refer to the SIC definition of the coal mining 
industry.  However, as stated above, the SIC and NAICS definitions of the coal industry are identical, and 
indeed, the estimate of average age based on NAICS (available for 2001 only) is 44.3 years, identical to the 
SIC estimate. 
25 Again, these estimates are custom tabulations from the 1996 and 2001 Censuses, based on a 20 per cent 
sample and referring to the SIC definition of the coal mining industry.    19 
 
F.  Technological and Process Developments 
 
  Coal mining technology is somewhat specific to the geology of individual mines.  
Open-pit mining relies heavily on large earth-moving machinery and high-capacity 
hauling vehicles.  Underground mines rely on large vehicles specifically designed for 
coal shearing, with most haulage requirements fulfilled by conveyor systems.  The 
website of the Coal Association of Canada states that there is currently only one 
underground coal mine in Canada, although the coal mines in Nova Scotia that have 
gradually been closing in recent years were underground operations. 
 
There have been several basic improvements in each of these coal mining 
processes in the past several decades, especially in the continually increasing capacity of 
large vehicles for extracting and hauling the coal.  Perhaps most importantly in the past 
decade, the control of many operations has been computerized, along with pre-mining 
planning and site design. 
 
Two specific innovations of recent years are worth noting briefly here.  First, 
although specific to underground room and pillar mining, the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation has announced the development of a new 
continuous mining system of machines that simultaneously extracts coal and installs roof-
supporting bolts (CSIRO, 1998).  This is intended to remove the need to halt production 
in order to manually install the roof bolts, both increasing worker safety, and improving 
productivity through decreasing pauses in production.  This is an example of the general 
trend towards more effective automated-control equipment in coal mining. 
 
Secondly, Gemcom, a mining consulting company based in Vancouver, British 
Columbia, has developed the GEMS software package for assistance with each stage of 
mining, from exploration to site planning to extraction.  Such software and consulting are 
of course not specific to coal mining, but rather are mentioned here as evidence of 
increasing computerization in mining operations in general. 
 
Lonmo (2003:17) shows that mining industries in Canada have tended to invest 
very little in research and development relative to their output compared to other 
industries.  This should not be regarded as firm evidence of technological decline and 
failure to innovate though.  Most technological advance in mining happens somewhat 
naturally through the availability of improved machinery and new tools and equipment 
supplied by other industries.
26  Further, Uhrbach and van Tol (2004) show that large 
firms – defined as those with more than 100 employees, which many coal mining 
                                                 
26 Lonmo (2003) also shows that mining industries have a high concentration of research and development, 
meaning that most R&D is performed by a limited number of firms in the industry.  Most natural resource 
industries have this same combination of high R&D concentration but low overall R&D intensity.  This is 
not necessarily detrimental, as it might be in manufacturing industries with limited inter-firm cooperation, 
since the largest mining companies with the greatest capacity to undertake research and development do so 
while smaller companies can simply buy into new innovations when they become available.  According to 
Global Economics (2001:11), Canadian corporations with mining operations that invested in R&D were, in 
descending order of the amount spent in 2000, Alcan, Noranda, Inco, Cominco and Falconbridge.  20 
operations have – virtually all use information technologies such as personal computers 
and high-speed internet access.  This suggests that, while groundbreaking technical 
advances may be difficult to identify, mining industries are not lagging in their innovative 
efforts. 
 
Indeed, a detailed study on the Canadian mining industry in general – 
commissioned by the Mining Association of Canada and prepared by Global Economics 
(2001) – finds that, despite having the image of an old-fashioned industry, the mining 
industry in Canada is actually quite dynamic and among the most intensive users of 
advanced technologies.  An earlier report by the Mining Association of Canada (1999) 
states that these technologies have focused on the use of global positioning systems in 
exploration, low-impact seismic excavation methods, underground communications 
systems, computer organization of mining activities, and internet use in procurement.  
Besides aiding the industry in adapting to global competition and uncertainty based on 
fluctuating prices and the margin of error in assaying during exploration, the report finds 
that these investments in technology have also contributed to impressive records in 
workplace safety and environmental performance. 
 
G.  Output Price 
 
  Given the different grades of coal (e.g. bituminous versus lignite), differential 
prices for different end-uses (e.g. electricity generation versus steel production), different 
pricing conventions (e.g. including versus not including freight charges), and the fact that 
Canada both imports and exports coal, it is difficult to identify a single price series to 
monitor.
27  The method here is to treat the implicit price index for the coal mining 
industry – calculated by dividing nominal coal mining GDP by real (constant dollar) coal 
mining GDP) – as an index of the nominal average price of coal paid by Canadians.  To 
convert this to a real price, the implicit price index can be deflated with the Consumer 
Price Index.  The real price series is shown in Chart 2 above. 
 
  The major characteristic of the real price of coal since 1961 has been the rapid 
increase in the mid-1970s in response to increasing demand after the first oil price shock 
in 1973, as businesses substituted cheaper coal for more expensive oil and gas.  Until 
then the price had been falling fairly steadily as new equipment and mining techniques 
meant that the relatively constant demand could be met with decreasing effort.  From 
1973 to 1976, the peak price after the oil shock, the real price of coal increased by about 
171 per cent.  After 1976 the real price of coal fell more or less steadily, reaching the 
level of the early 1970s by about the mid-1980s.  Between 1981 and 1989 the real price 
of coal fell by 54 per cent, and by a further 33 per cent between 1989 and 2000. 
 
                                                 
27 The website of the Coal Association of Canada states that about one half of Canadian coal production is 
of bituminous coal, one third is subbituminous, and the remainder is lignite.  About 40 per cent of coal 
production is used for steel making, with the remaining 60 per cent for heating/electricity generation.  
Major importers of Canadian coal are Japan, Korea, Germany and the United States.  Coal imports from 
Colombia and the United States are used in electricity generation and steel making in eastern Canada, 
although some coal from Western Canada is also used for electricity generation in Ontario.  21 
H.  Regulation and Taxation 
 
  Castrilli (1999) provides a detailed discussion of regulations, especially 
environmental, facing the Canadian mining industry.  Without repeating this analysis in 
detail, it is sufficient to mention only a few limited examples.  The most significant 
regulations facing mines in terms of their effect on increasing mining costs or altering 
mining behaviour are probably those concerning the health and safety of workers, and the 
reclamation of landscape and clean-up of the site at closing.  It is, however, difficult to 
tell how these regulations would affect the costs and productivity of mining industries 
relative to the regulations facing other industries in Canada or mining industries in other 
countries.  Certainly in the past few decades, after the most significant safety regulations 
were passed in the 1970s, it does not appear that regulation in the mining industry has 
increased at a faster pace than for other industries. 
 
  Statistics Canada (2001:110) provides estimates of expenditures on pollution 
abatement by industry, which can serve as a rough proxy of how environmental 
regulations affect costs under the assumption that the majority of environmental 
expenditures are motivated by regulation.  In 1997, the mining industry spent an 
estimated $66.7 million complying with environmental regulations.  This is equivalent to 
about 0.9 per cent of the current dollar value added of the mining sector.  For the overall 
business sector, expenditures on pollution control were $1,545.8 million in 1997, or about 
0.2 per cent of current dollar value added.  This suggests that the mining industry faces a 
higher regulatory burden relative to other industries.  However, it is also likely that some 
of these regulations have ultimately benefited the industry in terms of worker 
performance in a safer environment and have brought social benefits in terms of an 
improved state of the environment. 
 
  Related to innovation in the mining industry is the taxation policy facing the 
industry, since such policies affect the incentives to invest.  Brewer, Bergevin and 
Arseneau (1999) and Dahlby (1999) provide detailed reviews of the taxation policies 
facing Canadian mining industries.  Mining companies face both corporate taxes and 
resource royalties, the latter designed to capture the economic rent of mineral extraction, 
or in other words the return over and above the cost of extracting the resource.  There are, 
however, special provisions in the corporate tax code for mining industries, including 
deductibility of exploration expenses and accelerated depreciation on some capital 
investments.  Overall Dahlby (1999) finds that the taxation burden for Canadian mining 
industries is below that for other Canadian industries and comparable to that for mining 
industries in other countries.  Therefore, the Canadian taxation system does not appear to 
be impeding innovation in the mining industry.
28 
                                                 
28 An earlier study by Boadway et al. (1987) finds that some mining taxation provisions may be biasing 
investment towards exploration and development and away from other types of investment, such as 
innovation in the extraction process (although this does not conflict with the proposition that the 
disincentives to innovate are less in mining than in other Canadian industries).  They argue that a tax on 
pure profits, as opposed to the corporate tax with special provisions, would remove this distortion.  More 
recently and not specific to Canada, Andrews-Speed and Rogers (1999) also suggest that directing taxes 
only at mining companies’ profits would be best for innovation, since this would provide a joint incentive  22 
 
I.  Environmental Performance 
 
  MiningWatch Canada is a non-profit organization that expresses concern for what 
it sees as irresponsible environmental and social behaviour of mining industries.  In a 
report titled Looking Below the Surface and jointly published by MiningWatch and the 
Pembina Institute, Winfield et al. (2002) state that much waste is created in the mining 
process, including overburden and other waste from the excavation process.
29  The report 
is especially concerned with an apparent shift in the concerns of governments towards 
providing greater support for mining industries and away from supporting environmental 
protection. 
 
  A different view on the environmental performance of mining industries is 
expressed by the Mining Association of Canada (2003).  This annual Environmental 
Progress Report states that combined releases to air and water of eight dangerous 
substances have been significantly reduced since 1993.  For example, releases of mercury 
fell by 94 per cent, and releases of arsenic by 54 per cent.  The report also discusses 
progress on a number of projects undertaken by the mining industry to reduce emissions 
and make environmental improvements, such as the Mine Environment Neutral Drainage 
research program and the National Orphaned/Abandoned Mines Initiative. 
 
  This divergence in views is in part driven by different perspectives, the first 
judging environmental performance at a given point in time and the second judging 
improvements over time.  It is not clear what the best way to measure environmental 
performance is, but it is also not clear what the linkages are between environmental 
progress and productivity.  Increased effort spent on environmental issues not related to 
the production process will decrease productivity, but such efforts may indirectly lead to 
productivity-enhancing process improvements.  In any case, the Mining Association of 
Canada (2003) report presents convincing evidence that there have been significant 
environmental improvements in the past decade, although it is not known what degree of 
selectivity was exercised in choosing which issues to report. 
 
J.  Unemployment and Capacity Utilization 
 
The unemployment rate in coal mining in 2001 was 7.0 per cent, compared to 7.4 
per cent in the total economy.  These estimates are from 2001 Census custom tabulations, 
and thus are not available for a long time period.  The Labour Force Survey only has data 
on the unemployment rate by industry publicly available for broad industry groups, but 
these data are available annually back to 1987 based on NAICS.  For mining and oil and 
gas the unemployment rate was 5.1 per cent in 2001.  This was a recession year for the 
overall Canadian economy, but unemployment actually declined in the mining and oil 
and gas industry, from 5.3 per cent in 2000 and 7.9 per cent in 1999.  This same pattern 
                                                                                                                                                 
to companies and governments to reduce mining costs (i.e. through the adoption of new technologies and 
processes). 
29 Not related to coal mining, the authors also mention tailings and contaminants from the ore concentration 
process, and air pollution during the smelting process.  23 
did not hold for the recession in the early 1990s, with unemployment in all industries 
increasing from 8.1 per cent of the labour force in 1990 to 10.3 per cent in 1991, and 
from 6.7 per cent in mining and oil and gas in 1990 to 8.6 per cent in 1991. 
 
  Capacity utilization in mining and oil and gas, which accounts for the proportion 
of available capital resources being used, was below the average for goods-producing 
industries in 2000, at 76.6 per cent relative to 85.5 per cent (CSLS, 2003:Table 43).  
However, some data are available for a more detailed industry breakdown, and show that 
for mining only the capacity utilization rate was 89.7 per cent in 2000, implying a very 
low rate of utilization for oil and gas.  Capacity utilization is strongly procyclical for both 
mining and all industries, falling during recessions and rising during expansions.  It is not 
known how well these average trends hold for the individual coal mining industry. 
 
 
III.  Productivity Levels and Trends in the Coal Mining Industry in 
Canada 
 
A.  Labour Productivity 
 
  The level of output per hour in coal mining in 2000 was $90.83 per hour in 
constant 1992 dollars, above the level for all mining industries of $66.13 and much 
higher than the all industries average of $28.99 per hour (CSLS, 2003:Table 33).  This 
has not historically been the case.  In the 1990s coal mining had a level of real output per 
hour well above that of the total economy average, but in the 1970s and 1980s coal 
mining’s relative level of real labour productivity was near the all industries average, and 
in the 1960s coal mining was less than half as productive as the total economy based on 
output per hour estimates in 1992 constant dollars.
30  The turnaround has been due to 
phenomenal productivity growth in the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s (Chart 4). 
 
  In the 1960s (1961-1973), output per hour advanced at an average annual rate of 
9.3 per cent per year in coal mining, towering over the all industries average of 3.4 per 
cent per year and the average for all mining industries of 4.9 per cent per year.  This 
growth gap allowed the coal mining industry to increase its productivity level relative to 
all industries from 44 per cent in 1961 to 85 per cent in 1973. 
 
  The decade of the 1970s (1973-1981) was a poor time for productivity growth for 
virtually all industries, and coal mining was no exception.  After the impressive 
performance of the 1960s, output per hour growth in coal mining fell to just 1.7 per cent 
per year, albeit still somewhat higher than total economy labour productivity growth of 
1.2 per cent per year.  The first oil price shock of 1973 lead to a sharp increase in the 
                                                 
30 Comparisons of productivity levels should ideally be made based on estimates in current dollars, which 
account for changes in relative prices over time.  Since the real price of coal was lower in 1992 than it was 
in 1961, the true level of coal mining output per hour in 1961 relative to that of the total economy is higher 
than that implied by comparisons based on 1992 dollar estimates.  Nonetheless, the point remains that there 
was a large upward shift in coal mining’s labour productivity level relative to that in the total economy 
between 1961 and 2000.  24 
demand for coal, and the consequent higher prices encouraged the exploitation of poorer 
quality coal reserves.  The increased effort required to extract these reserves had a 




  By 1981 the price of coal had stopped rising, and the 1980s (1981-1989) saw a 
return to the 1960s output per hour growth rate of 9.3 per cent per year (Table 2).  The 
total economy saw output per hour grow by only 1.0 per cent per year over this same 
period, and by 1989, coal mining’s labour productivity level was 166 per cent that of all 
industries. 
 
Table 2: Productivity Growth in the Coal Mining Industry in Canada, 1961-2000, 
compound average annual growth rates, per cent 




1961-2000  7.18  1.00  3.66 
1961-1973  9.29  -5.61  0.64 
1973-1981  1.71  0.17  0.84 
1981-1989  9.30  6.65  7.80 
1989-2000  7.44  5.13  6.14 
1989-1995  2.38  4.10  3.34 
1995-2000  13.85  6.38  9.59 
Source: CSLS (2003), with updates from GDP by Industry, the Labour Force Survey, and 
the Capital Stocks Division. 
 
  Output per hour growth for the 1989-2000 period was a strong 7.4 per cent per 
year in coal mining.  This compares to 1.4 per cent per year for the total economy and 4.6 
per cent per year for mining.  For coal mining this includes weaker productivity growth 
of 2.4 per cent per year for the 1989-1995 period, following the recession of the early 
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1990s, and incredible 13.9 per cent per year average annual growth for the 1995-2000 
period.  For the overall 1961-2000 period, output per hour growth in coal mining was 
extremely rapid relative to the total economy, at 7.2 per cent per year compared to 1.9 per 
cent per year (Chart 5). 
 
Chart 5: Output per Hour Growth in the Coal Mining 
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  Canada’s coal mining industry appears to have performed fairly well in terms of 
labour productivity growth relative to other countries as well as to other Canadian 
industries.  Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that output per hour 
growth in the U.S. coal mining industry for 1961-2000 was 3.4 per cent per year.
31  This 
compares to growth of 7.2 per cent per year for the Canadian coal mining industry, more 
than twice as fast as growth in the U.S. industry.  For the more recent 1989-2000 period, 
the growth rates were 5.0 per cent per year in the United States and 7.4 per cent per year 
in Canada.  The International Labour Organization (2002) reports that labour productivity 
in coal mining increased by over 100 per cent in Canada, India and the United States 
between 1985 and 2000.  Australia and South Africa performed even better though. 
 
Global Economics (2001) reports that Canada’s level of coal mining labour 
productivity was about 85 per cent that in the United States in 2000 (i.e., 5.9 tonnes of 
coal were produced per hour of work in the United States, compared to 5.0 tonnes per 
hour of work in Canada).  Combining this level estimate with estimates of productivity 
growth in each country shows that this labour productivity relative of 85 per cent in 2000 
is about the same as that achieved in 1989, meaning that the incredible output per hour 
growth of the Canadian coal mining industry in the 1990s was matched by an equally 
strong performance in the U.S. industry (Chart 6).  But the high levels of labour 
productivity relative to the United States after the late 1980s represent a significant 
                                                 
31 These data are from the Industry Productivity and Costs program of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
A series based on the U.S. SIC has been linked to a NAICS-based series in 1987.  Data are available at 
www.bls.gov, and the NAICS data for 2001 are also available in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2003).  26 
turnaround from earlier decades.  In 1961 the level of output per hour in the coal mining 




B.  Capital Productivity 
 
  Output per unit of capital stock showed strong declines in coal mining in the 
1960s, falling by 5.6 per cent per year between 1961 and 1973 (Table 2).  Capital 
productivity growth in all industries was 1.1 per cent per year in 1961-1973.  Capital 
productivity growth in coal mining began to rebound in the 1970s, growing by an average 
annual rate of 0.2 per cent per year, compared to declines of 5.2 per cent per year in all 
mining industries and 0.8 per cent per year in the total economy.  After 1981, capital 
productivity in coal mining, like labour productivity, grew rapidly. 
 
C.  Total Factor Productivity 
 
  Total factor productivity in coal mining was weak in the 1960s and 1970s at the 
same time that labour productivity growth was strong, explained by the rapid growth in 
this period of the capital stock.  TFP growth rebounded sharply in the 1980s and 
continued with strong growth in the 1990s.  At the total economy level, TFP growth was 
strongest in 1961-1973, falling off thereafter but remaining positive, and showing some 
signs of acceleration since the mid 1990s (Table 2).  Total factor productivity growth 
rates are very sensitive to the method used to calculate the TFP index.  As was discussed 
previously, a simple Cobb-Douglas production function has been assumed, with constant 
returns to scale in capital stock and hours worked and fixed factor shares over the entire 
1961-2000 period examined. 
 
 
Chart 6: Relative Level of Output per Hour in Coal  
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IV.  Explaining Labour Productivity Trends in the Coal Mining 
Industry in Canada 
 
A.  Decomposition of Labour Productivity Growth 
 
  Following the same production function methodology briefly explained in the 
second section for total factor productivity, it is possible to decompose labour 
productivity growth into TFP growth and growth in capital intensity.  Further, capital 
intensity can be divided into the three component classifications, namely building 
construction, engineering construction and machinery and equipment.  Contributions for 
various periods are shown in Table 3 below. 
 
  The table shows that by far the most important component of labour productivity 
growth in coal mining since 1981 has been total factor productivity.  One view on total 
factor productivity growth is that it represents the pace of technological advance of an 
industry, or at least the part of technical progress that is not related to new technologies 
embedded in the capital stock.  However, given the limited production function 
framework utilized, there is a strong possibility that several important factors of 
production have not been explicitly accounted for.  This implies that these other factors – 
along with the bias of restricting production to exhibit constant returns to scale – have 
been pushed into the contribution of TFP growth to output per hour growth.  For a more 
complete explanation of productivity trends, these other important factors of the 
production process need to be examined individually. 
 
  First, however, it is worth briefly mentioning capital intensity’s contribution to 
output per hour growth in coal mining.  Growth in capital stock per hour worked 
accounted for almost all of labour productivity growth in the 1960s and early 1970s 
(1961-1973) and about half of labour productivity growth in the 1970s (1973-1981).  Its 
contribution after 1981, although large in absolute terms, was much smaller in relative 
terms.  In the 1960s, growth in the engineering capital stock per hour worked was the 
most important contributor to output per hour growth, followed by growth in building 
capital stock per hour worked and in machinery and equipment capital stock per hour 
worked.  The engineering capital stock for mining industries includes exploration and site 
development activity, implying that the extremely high productivity growth of this period 
may have been driven by the search for and subsequent exploitation of high quality 
reserves.  In general, the high contribution of capital intensity suggests that production in 
the 1960s was driven by adoption of new machinery and increased investment in haulage 
and conveyance equipment.  This type of investment of course continued, at least until 
the declines of the late 1980s and 1990s, but was overshadowed after the 1960s by other 
factors.
32 
                                                 
32 Another consequence of the limited production function utilized is that the role of capital intensity is 
likely underestimated.  Romer (1987) casts much doubt on the precision of the type of decomposition 
technique utilized here, and states that such methods probably underestimate the role of capital to a large 
degree.  Therefore, the rather limited contributions made by capital intensity in the 1980s and 1990s should 
not be regarded as wholly accurate.  However, these objections do not obviate the need to examine other 
factors contributing to labour productivity growth.  28 
 
Table 3: Average Annual Growth in Output per Hour and its Components in the Coal 


































  1) Compound Average Annual Growth Rates, per cent 
1961-2000  7.18  3.66  6.12  6.48  6.51  4.46 
1961-1973  9.29  0.64  15.78  17.16  16.33  13.33 
1973-1981  1.71  0.84  1.53  1.10  1.83  0.84 
1981-1989  9.30  7.80  2.48  3.08  3.21  -1.17 
1989-2000  7.44  6.14  2.20  2.00  2.26  2.09 
  2) Absolute Contributions to Output per Hour Growth, percentage points 
1961-2000  7.18  3.66  3.44  0.55  2.49  0.42 
1961-1973  9.29  0.64  8.87  1.38  5.97  1.55 
1973-1981  1.71  0.84  0.86  0.09  0.69  0.09 
1981-1989  9.30  7.80  1.40  0.28  1.21  -0.11 
1989-2000  7.44  6.14  1.24  0.17  0.90  0.16 
  3) Relative Contributions to Output per Hour Growth, per cent 
1961-2000  100  51.0  47.9  7.6  34.8  5.9 
1961-1973  100  6.9  95.5  14.8  64.3  16.7 
1973-1981  100  49.3  50.4  5.1  40.2  5.3 
1981-1989  100  83.9  15.0  3.0  13.0  -1.2 
1989-2000  100  82.5  16.6  2.3  12.1  2.2 
Source: Calculated from CSLS (2003:Tables 33 through 40) and updated with more recent 
unpublished data from Statistics Canada, Capital Stocks and GDP by Industry Divisions. 
Note: The contribution of capital intensity growth to output per hour growth is defined as 
growth in the total capital stock per hour work multiplied by capital’s share of value added 
(0.5623, from the CSLS productivity data base by industry and province).  The growth rate of 
capital per hour is the weighted average of the three components of capital divided by hours 
worked, where the weights are the average shares of each component in the total capital stock 
over each period.  Contributions do not sum exactly to totals due to rounding and the 
approximate nature of the decomposition. 
 
B.  The Contributions of Price, Technology, Skills and Other Factors to 
Productivity Growth 
 
  Total factor productivity growth as calculated here indicates the proportion of 
output growth that is not accounted for by growth in hours worked and in capital 
accumulation.  This implies that TFP is affected by all other factors related to the 
production process, such as the skills and quality of the workforce, improvements in the  29 
organization of production and the technology available, compositional effects of closing 
lower productivity mines, the effects of possible increasing returns to scale, and so on. 
 
  As discussed above, the limited evidence available suggests that the coal mining 
workforce is highly skilled.  Average years of education per worker are slightly above the 
all industries average, but this is driven by a lower proportion of workers with a 
university degree.  University degrees may not be particularly relevant for mining 
workers since they generally do not embody skills germane to the type of labour required 
of miners.  A more relevant distinction may be post-secondary certificates, since colleges 
and trade schools are more focused on teaching skills directly.  The proportion of the 
mining workforce with a post-secondary certificate or diploma is above average, 
indicating that workers are well trained for the work they do.  As well, the slightly above-
average age of the mining workforce may suggest a higher level of experience than other 
industries.  There is no doubt that these credentials are important in maintaining the 
relatively high level of output per hour in the coal mining industry, and that their gradual 
growth has played a part in productivity growth.  It is therefore reasonable to suppose that 
skills have accounted for a proportion of measured TFP growth. 
 
  It is possible that some coal mines experience increasing returns to scale – i.e. a 
doubling of all their production inputs would lead to more than a doubling of coal 
production – but that it is not possible for these mines to reach optimal scale due to the 
fixed geology and organization of the mining site.  In these circumstances the 
contribution of TFP growth to output per hour growth would be less in periods in which 
capital and labour were both increasing.  Correspondingly, the contribution of capital 
intensity during these periods would be higher, which follows since by the nature of 
increasing returns, the additional capital and labour would increase output more than 
proportionately.  Therefore, a further cause of upwardly biased measured TFP growth, at 
least in the 1970s and 1980s before the capital stock began to decline, may be the 
existence of increasing returns to scale.  This would in turn imply that the capital-driven 
productivity growth of the 1960s continued at least in part into the 1970s and 1980s.  
There is some evidence of increases in the size of operations in the 1970s and to a lesser 
extent in the 1980s.  The average number of jobs per coal mining establishment was 115 
in 1961, which rose rapidly to 224 in 1973 and 427 in 1981, and then declined slightly to 
378 in 1989 and further to 308 in 2001. 
 
  As has been mentioned previously, the price of coal may also be driving part of 
the output per hour performance of the coal industry, and this effect would be captured in 
the catch-all TFP growth.  When the real price of coal increases, as it did sharply in the 
mid-1970s, it becomes profitable to mine coal seams that were previously unprofitable to 
mine due to high costs, e.g. in removing overburden or in sinking deep shafts.  These 
mine sites typically require high labour input to produce a comparable amount of output 
to sites with richer and more easily accessible deposits.  As such, the lower labour 
productivity of these new mines decreases the average labour productivity of the overall 
industry.  This price effect may partially explain the low productivity growth of the 1970s 
and the extraordinary growth of the second half of the 1990s.  The real price of coal has 
fallen steadily since the mid-1970s, but the pace at which it has declined accelerated  30 
somewhat in the second half of the 1990s relative to the first half.  This may have pushed 
some smaller and less productive mines across the line of profitability, thereby increasing 
the average productivity of the overall industry. 
 
  One other contribution to the acceleration in coal mining output per hour growth 
in the second half of the 1990s may be the gradual closing of the mines in Cape Breton.  
These mines tended to be of smaller scale, and small-scale underground mining is in 
general less productive than large-scale open-pit operations.
33  This last observation, 
along with the probable link between declines in the price of coal and the closure of less 
productive mines, is certainly borne out by the declining number of coal mining 
establishments in Canada throughout the second half of the 1990s, from 34 in 1995 to 21 
in 2001. 
 
  A final driver of measured TFP growth indeed appears to be technological 
advance.  Although embedded in the engineering capital stock, conveyor and haulage 
systems represent a process innovation not captured by investment expenditures.  Further, 
many investments in the 1970s were made in part to comply with safety regulations, and 
it appears that a safer work environment – captured partially in the incidence of 
workplace injuries and fatalities statistics – has paid off in terms of higher labour 
productivity.  Safer mines are less prone to suspensions in production, and allow workers 
to concentrate more fully on their primary tasks.  In the 1990s, although investment in 
coal mining declined, it is likely that the investment that did take place was in advanced 
software and computer systems.  These investments have provided an ability to plan and 
implement optimal extraction strategies not previously available. 
 
C.  Summary of Labour Productivity Drivers by Decade 
 
  Based on these observations, the following proximate drivers of productivity 
growth in the Canadian coal mining industry have been identified. 
 
·  1960s: strong labour productivity growth driven by strong capital intensity growth 
(new operating processes, conveyor systems and larger vehicles). 
 
·  1970s: weak labour productivity growth, partly attributable to labour disputes and 
adaptation to new regulations, but driven primarily by high demand for coal, 
which increased the price of coal and encouraged the exploitation of marginal 
reserves. 
 
·  1980s: a return to very high productivity growth, but not due to capital deepening 
as in the 1960s.  Rather, falling prices forced mines on less productive sites to 
close, while the transition from underground to higher-productivity surface mines 
was also taking place. 
 
                                                 
33 Indeed, the Energy Information Administration (2002:Table 7.6) shows that surface mines in the United 
States had a higher level and faster growth rates of labour productivity than underground mines over the 
entire 1949-2002 period.  31 
·  1990s: weak productivity growth in the first half of the decade but exceptional 
growth in the latter half.  Prices continued to fall, but the more important driver 





  Coal mining has had a phenomenal record in terms of labour productivity growth.  
For the past two decades, growth in output per hour has been on the order of 8 per cent 
per year or more, exceeding the total economy average by a factor of five.  Such strong 
productivity growth was also evident in the 1960s, with the only period of weak growth 
being the decade or less following the first oil price shock. 
 
  One important driver of this impressive growth appears to be technological 
advance.  Although mining industries tend to undertake very little research and 
development on their own, there is a continual absorption of new technology and 
processes through the purchase of new equipment.  R&D within sectors producing 
equipment used by the coal industry hence has a larger impact on coal mining 
productivity growth, especially when the coal mining industry has incentives to invest in 
the most up-to-date equipment available coupled with training programs in the effective 
use of such new equipment.  The most important of such investments in recent years 
appears to be those made in computer systems, both for controlling and monitoring 
operation and in detailed extraction planning. 
 
It is also important to stress once again the high quality of the coal mining 
workforce and the role that these skilled workers have played in maintaining the level and 
growth of output per hour in coal mining much above the average for all industries.  
Continued growth in the proportion of the coal mining workforce with post-secondary 
experience will have beneficial productivity effects, especially in combination with 
increased computerization of the mining process. 
 
A final mention should be made of the apparent effect of the real price of coal on 
productivity in the coal mining industry.  The sluggish productivity growth in the 1970s 
and the strong growth in the 1990s have been accompanied respectively by a sharp 
increase in the CPI-deflated price of coal and by persistent declines in this price in the 
1990s.  Especially in the second half of the 1990s, the low and falling real price of coal 
appears to have given lower-productivity mines an incentive to close, leaving only the 
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